Science or Society? - The Social Function of Science Revisited by Tyabji, Nasir
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Science or Society? - The Social Function
of Science Revisited
Nasir Tyabji
1999
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/67436/
MPRA Paper No. 67436, posted 26. October 2015 14:13 UTC
Nasir Tyabji 
Science or society? 
—The social function of science revisited 
Exactly 
sixty years ago, J.D. Bernal began his exploration of the 
social function of science with the following words: 
The events of the past few years have led to a critical examination 
of the function of science in society. It used to be believed that the 
results of scientific investigation would lead to continuous 
progressive improvements in conditions of life; but first the War 
and then the economic crisis have shown that science can be used 
as easily for destructive and wasteful purposes, and voices have 
been raised demanding the cessation of scientific research as the 
only means of preserving a tolerable civilization.1 
This is a revealing statement. Even before the atomic bomb at 
tacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and long long before Chernobyl, 
and the 'big dams' controversies of the 1970s onwards, there was an 
influential body of opinion which held that the preservation of 
civilization was incompatible with the progress of scientific research. 
More critically, Bernal went on to say that 
For those who have once seen it, the frustration of science is a very 
bitter thing. It shows itself as disease, enforced stupidity, misery, 
thankless toil, and premature death for the great majority, and an 
anxious, grasping and futile life for the remainder. Science can 
change all this, but only science working with those social forces 
which understand its functions and which march to the same 
ends. 
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In 1945, the dispatches by the Soviet journalist Vassili Grossman 
provided a good example of the vision that the amalgam of science 
with society could provide. Grossman travelled with the advanced 
guard of the Red Army into a Ukraine despoiled by years of Nazi 
occupation. Surveying the ruins in the Donbas region, he wrote 
New cities shall rise in place of those that have been razed, the 
fields rank with weeds shall again be planted with grain, young 
forests shall grow up, pretty white cottages shall spring up on the 
sites of sacked villages, the Donbas, land of coal and steel, will 
come back to life.3 
The language may sound quaintly padre-like. What is important 
is the conception of an agricultural economy in harmony with indus 
try, and of a social order that combines village neighbourliness with 
the technological dynamism of an industrial society. 
At the end of the twentieth century the battle to overcome the 
devastating societal characteristics identified by Bernal, is no closer to 
being joined: any victory lies in the dim future. More disconcertingly, 
there is now a substantially stronger body of intellectual opinion that 
would question Bernal's formulation that there is indeed an answer 
to these societal problems and it lies in the amalgam of science and 
"those social forces that understand its functions." 
Once travelling across the Ukraine's desolate landscape a sudden 
glimpse of smoke rising from a lone factory chimney, cold and inert 
for years, signaled hope. Factory, work and bread again. Times change 
and the smoking chimney signals something else again—quite the 
contrary. Today, coal and steel production have a negative image as 
threatening to the sustained existence of forests, and certainly to the 
preservation of a society enveloped in the warmth of a network of 
pretty cottages. 
To such a body of opinion, Bernal's formulation represents the 
essence of hackneyed thought: for after all, does science have ends? If 
so, are these ends good in themselves? If science's 'good ends' have 
been subverted by inimical social forces, what then? Do benevolent 
social forces have any hope of coming into control of science? And to 
add a further question: are social forces of any relevance when the 
market decides all? 
In fact the issues then at stake were precisely the ones these 
questions raise, except perhaps the last.4 However, Bernal's was, self 
professedly, a social and economic, rather than a philosophical inquiry. 
His most critical concern was with the question as to whether those 
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social forces currently funding the work of scientists—not science— 
did indeed have aims and ends. If they did, and he identified the ends 
to be the further development of industrial production in its broadest 
sense, then clearly the scientific work they funded also served specific 
ends.5 However, he argued in his book: scientists (not science) had 
both volition and, potentially, political agency. 
In fact, since the industrial revolution, and still more so since the 
Scientific and Technological revolution of the post-World War II 
period, science has entered directly into the process of production.'1 
Consequently, there have evolved the categories of pure research 
('science' in the generally accepted meaning of the term), applied 
research, and developmental research. 
Most critics of science would, of course, expend little energy in 
discussing the nature of applied and developmental research. This 
research, in their view, is clearly motivated by industrial imperatives 
that cannot be in harmony with sustainable agriculture, preservation 
of forests, or a society based on pretty cottages. 
It is the nature of pure research that has been the real target of 
criticism. The question that is raised is no longer, as with Bernal, of 
whether research in pure mathematics is utterly useless and whether 
it is socially responsible as in G.H. Hardy's celebration, in 'A 
Mathematician's Apology'. The question now is whether the state 
ment that it is 'useless' is indeed valid. Are pure mathematicians free 
of a nexus with the destructive tendencies of modern industrial 
society? 
There is, apparently, support given to this line of criticism by the 
argument that in an era of high technology industry, the agenda for 
pure research is often decided by problems that are posed for industry: 
"...scientific progress has become increasingly dependent on tech 
nology. Indeed, it is tempting to say that an alternative definition 
of a high technology industry is one in which problems that arise 
at the technological frontier exercise a major role in shaping the 
research agenda of science. In these industries, it is not enough to 
say that scientific knowledge is applied to the productive process; 
rather, to a considerable extent, such knowledge is also being 
generated there.7 
So it would appear that even pure research or science does have 
ends, and that these ends set the direction and pace of scientific 
progress. In Bernal's terms, those social forces that finance the scien 
tific project as a whole determine these ends. 
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There has, of course, been some discernible progress towards the 
application of science for the public good. The formation and function 
ing of UNICEF, UNESCO and UNCTAD at the international level and 
the, admittedly spotty, results of the planning process in India provide 
examples of the ways in which science has advanced societal goals. 
However, the great social transformation that "The Social Function of 
Science" advocated, if not foresaw, is even in the most optimistic view, 
now on hold. 
o 
Simultaneously with this socio-political stasis, there has been a sig 
nificant rise in both, the radical critique of science amongst some 
sections of the intelligentsia, on the one hand, and a feeling of apathetic 
acceptance of the material benefits of modern technological develop 
ments by a large section of society, on the other. This latter feature is a 
far more disturbing trend for Bernalism, than the hostile intellectual 
currents. A major impetus to this growing apathy has come from the 
effects of the major technological developments of the last 50 years 
which have been identified as markers of the Scientific and Tech 
nological Revolution. The development of processes for the controlled 
release of nuclear energy and the development of electronics form one 
aspect of this era. However, this has coincided with the appearance of 
specific artefacts, such as the atomic and hydrogen bomb, and the 
callous commercially-driven introduction of others, such as imperfect 
ly tested drugs like thalidomide. The prevalence of a series of disasters 
associated with these artefacts such as plane crashes, dam bursts and 
nuclear disasters in power plants has even led to the sardonic charac 
terization of this era as associated with "normal accidents".8 
These events have given fresh life to the growth of artefactist 
thought—a line of philosophical reasoning that argues that the dis 
asters sometimes associated with the use of modern technological 
artefacts are caused by the very nature of the technological processes 
themselves. In one of its most recent formulations, the artefactist line 
of reasoning would, for instance, distinguish between the implications 
for society between the handtools of the handicrafts era and the 
machines of subsequent eras as follows: because they are dependent 
on human users for both their source of movement and for guidance 
in their action, handtools have a unique relationship and dependency 
on human beings. To the extent that machines become independent, 
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not only of human energy sources, but also of a human directing 
agency (as with automation) they begin to achieve a degree of 
autonomy Further, because machines concentrate increasingly 
greater quanta of energy in the hands of users, they necessarily intro 
duce high levels of inequalities into the social order that would other 
wise not have happened. According to this line of reasoning, the 
person who owns a machine has more power than one who does not. 
Power is thus seen to grow out of the structure of the tool or machine 
rather than from the social organization. 
Leading on from this argument is the proposition that technology 
can become autonomous in relation to human users (even if not to its 
manufacturers). Different kinds of technology can have inherent fea 
tures that generate quite distinctive impacts on societal orders. Most 
crucially, this is true independent of the social context within which 
some particular technology might be embedded or the particular 
social process it is associated with. 
One of the major reasons for the growth and social acceptability 
of this line of reasoning has lain in the frightening attempts by some 
proponents of technology to promote technological solutions to socie 
tal crisis even before the problem has been sorted out into its socio 
cultural (and political) and technological components. This is a 
manifestation of a narrowly technical philosophy of technology (and 
society). They attempt, as did mechanistic philosophies of science 
when the social sciences were emerging in the nineteenth century, to 
present technological reasoning as a mode of thought superior to all 
others.10 
o 
There is, however, another philosophic issue. As mentioned earlier, 
the 'Project of Modernity' is incorrectly identified with the capitalist 
industrialization process. Similarly, the identification of 'modern' 
science with the growth of science within the philosophical framework 
of Cartesian reductionism which anti- science critics hold as uncontes 
table is indeed an incorrect view. It is well known that science is not 
only a structure of knowledge, but also a conceptual mode of thinking 
that touches on the interrelated parts of our experience. Despite the 
enormous advances in knowledge within the Cartesian structure, its 
philosophical basis is the root of frustration such as that of Bernal as 
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a practising scientist and similarly, its results are the targets of frontal 
attack by the critics of science. 
For a long period after Descartes, philosophical thought in the 
sciences was based on four principles:12 
1) That a system consists of a natural set of units or parts 
2) The units are exactly similar, at least in their effects on the whole, 
of which they form the parts. 
3) The parts invariably precede the whole in that they exist in 
isolation, and come together to form wholes. The parts have 
intrinsic properties which they possess even in isolation and which 
they lend to the whole. In the simplest case, the whole is the sum 
of the parts. In more complex cases, interactions among the parts 
may produce additional properties in the whole. 
4) Causes are separate from effects, the former being properties of 
subjects and the latter of objects. Subjects may respond to "feed 
back" from objects, but the causing subject and the caused object 
are ultimately separate and distinct. 
Within this set of principles, social practice defines which of a 
chain of mutually intersecting causes becomes the cause of a given 
effect. In medical research, tubercle bacillus become the cause of 
tuberculosis, rather than (pace Bernal), the conditions of capitalist 
urbanization. Posing the problem as one that flows out of a specific 
form of the urbanization process would imply a political approach to 
the problem. The issue would then be considered beyond the realm of 
medical research.13 More crucially, problems that cannot be resolved 
within the framework are held to be formally irresolvable, for the 
specialist (the unit) cannot be expected to view the problem from a 
perspective distinct to the system of which he or she forms a part. 
o 
The protagonist in Tom Stoppard's Jumpers makes an important 
point in the course of preparing a lecture on the existence of God. The 
point is that such a lecture can only be delivered, safely, when there is 
a substantia] body of opinion within the establishment that doubts 
God's existence. Given that at some point in a suitably defined past, 
the balance of establishment opinion must have been in favour of faith 
in God's existence, Stoppard points out that there must have been a 
historical moment when the "noes had it." In other words, at that point 
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of time, a quantitative movement in the voting pattern had led to a 
qualitative shift of enormous societal significance.14 
The point that must concern all those who share Bernal's concerns 
is whether such a change in the balance (a 'belief' in the benign nature 
of scientific knowledge moving on through agnosticism to hostility) 
underlies the apathetic acceptance of technologically created artefacts 
mentioned earlier. Critics of science have often charged that modernity 
has simply replaced a faith in God with a faith in science. 
Of course, the basis of society's failure to transform this faith into 
what we in India termed the 'scientific temper'is clear. It is the same 
gulf that lay between C.P. Snow's two cultures, which operated even 
within Senior Common Rooms. The root lies in the pattern of resource 
allocation that failed to provide opportunities for a proper science 
education for all. It was this feature of modern capitalist society, rather 
than that of an abstract 'project of modernity/ that froze the spread of 
informed appreciation of science to the confines of the techno-scien 
tific power elite. For the huge majority who looked forward to a life 
that was free of both enforced stupidity or a grasping futility, science 
thus remained a faith. 
The battle to preserve this 'faith' must first of all ensure that the 
"noes" do not have it in the societal counting of votes. But this chal 
lenge is now clearly intertwined with the larger effort to advance the 
scientific temper, seen in its true garb as the 'informed appreciation of 
science'. This battle is as much social and political, as a philosophical 
one, as was Bernal's original intervention sixty years ago. □ 
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